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Abstract
Assuming a production process with returns to scale that vary with the intensity
it is operated at, an AK-model of endogenous growth with constant returns to scale
in production is shown to arise due to replication driven by prot-maximization. If
replication occurs at the eciency-maximizing scale, the result applies also when
the number of production processes must be discrete, thus overcoming the so-called
integer problem. When competition is imperfect, there is only convergence toward
the AK-model for large enough input use, so an economy is more prone to stalling
in a steady-state without growth, the smaller and less competitive it is. Inecient
scaling also raises the risk of stalling.
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1 Introduction
In economic growth theory, the returns to scale in the factors of production that the
economy accumulates endogenously are crucial for its long-run evolution. In particu-
lar, when these are decreasing, growth comes to a halt in the absence of any external
impetus, as illustrated by Solow (1956). Therefore, models with sustained endogenous
growth have increasing or constant returns to scale in the endogenously accumulated
inputs, including those rst proposed by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). Constant
returns to scale are particularly popular, giving rise to the well-known AK-model (Re-
belo (1991)), which can endogenously sustain a strictly positive constant rate of growth,
a so-called balanced-growth rate, consistent with the empirical stylized facts rst de-
scribed by Kaldor (1963). Despite its crucial role, the nature of the returns to scale
is always assumed, never derived, which is a major deciency of endogenous-growth
models (McCallum (1996)). At most, authors argue that replication leads to non-
decreasing returns to scale, since if a production process can be reproduced exactly,
the copy should arguably yield the same output as the original (Koopmans (1957), Shell
(1966), Romer (1990, 1994) and Jones (1999, 2005)). However, this is insucient, as
it says nothing about production levels that are not a multiple of what the original
process yields, and can therefore not be generated by copying at the original scale; the
so-called integer problem (Romer (1990)).
If one assumes it is possible to copy the production process with the same degree of
eciency at any scale, returns to scale are constant for all levels of production, but by
assumption. Instead, we assume that the eciency of a production process, including
its returns to scale, varies with the intensity it is operated at, an idea that goes back at
least to Marshall (1890). Hence, exact replication, including the scale, yields the same
output as the original, but copies that are scaled up or down are not equally ecient.
Consequently, producers' scaling and replication of the process determines the returns
to scale in production. In order to maximize eciency, producers operate the process as
close as possible to the intensity where its returns to scale are constant, and replicate it
as production increases. However, they cannot do so exactly at this intensity, because
the number of processes must be a positive integer, since otherwise the scale of the
production process can be varied without aecting its eciency, for example by run-
ning half a process at the eciency-maximizing scale, thus violating our fundamental
assumption. Only when the process is replicated at the eciency-maximizing intensity
does total production have constant returns to scale, which requires that nothing dis-
tort the prot-maximizing intensity away from the eciency-maximizing one, and that
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competition be perfect, or with imperfect competition, that the number of processes,
and thus replications, be large enough.
Because constant returns to scale, and the AK-model, only arise for large enough
input use when competition is imperfect, endogenous growth can come to a halt in
smaller economies, even when larger, but otherwise identical economies, keep on grow-
ing forever. Moreover, the marginal product of the input would be lower in the stalled
economy, making it unable to attract a ow of input from the other. The reason is that
it is harder to achieve the eciency-maximizing scaling in smaller economies, which
reduces the marginal products of inputs and aects their accumulation. As a result,
an economy's starting point not only aects its growth rate, but could even deter-
mine whether it will stall or keep growing endogenously forever. Consequently, policies
usually considered to have only a short-term impact on the rate of growth, such as a
temporary inow of inputs, or a transitory increase in competition, can have perma-
nent eects, by getting a stalled economy on to the path of never-ending endogenous
growth.
There are many reasons why the eciency of a production process can vary with
the scale it is operated at. One is the physical nature of the process, for example, in
mineral extraction returns to scale might be decreasing as a result of the most easily
extractable resources being exploited rst. Another is specialization, which can make
eciency increase with the scale, as each worker concentrates more and more on the
task at which he has a comparative advantage, instead of having to do a little of
everything.1 Returns to scale might initially be increasing due to the fact that it takes
some time to get accustomed to performing a task, and doing so eciently, while they
turn decreasing as fatigue or boredom kicks in. Additional factors that can contribute to
increasing returns to scale are xed costs, synergies and learning-by-doing. Decreasing
returns to scale can arise due to coordination and communication problems, which are
more likely to emerge the larger the scale of operation.2 It can also be harder to provide
proper supervision and motivation in larger units, where the incentives to free-ride are
greater.
Assuming a logarithmic production process with returns to scale that go from being
increasing to decreasing as production rises, the next section derives an AK produc-
tion function with constant returns to scale based on replication driven by producers'
1In order for the degree of specialization to vary with the scale, there must be indivisibilities in
production (Edgeworth (1911), Kaldor (1934), Wicksell (1934) and Lerner (1944)).
2The managerial input can lead to decreasing returns to scale (Marshall (1890), Kaldor (1934) and
Hicks (1939)) even when it increases proportionally with all other inputs, as it becomes overstretched
due to the more than proportional complexity of the organization. The same applies for communication.
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eorts to maximize eciency. The following two sections dene the rest of the general
equilibrium model and study its dynamics, respectively. Subsequently, we show that
when the number of processes must be a positive integer, there is only convergence
toward constant returns to scale when replication occurs at the eciency-maximizing
intensity.
2 Production with optimal replication
Imagine the output y of a production process depends on the input k through the
function
y = a log (bk) (1)
with given constants a > 0 and b > 0. Its returns to scale are increasing for k 2
(1=b; e=b), decreasing for k > e=b, and constant at k = e=b.3 Output is zero for
k = 1=b, and strictly negative for k < 1=b. Because the production process is a concave
function, the optimal allocation among multiple identical processes is symmetrical, so
the most total output Y that can be produced with N processes and K total input is
Y = Na log

b
K
N

 H (K;N) (2)
where Y = N  y and K = N  k. If N could be varied continuously, the rst-order
condition
@H (K;N)
@N
= a

log

b
K
N

  1

= 0 (3)
would yield the optimal number of processes
N (K) = be 1K (4)
since H is concave in N . The corresponding production function
Y = H (K;N (K)) = abe 1K  AK (5)
yields the most output that could be produced with any amount of total input K. For
given a and b, output Y would be linear in the input K, and have constant returns
to scale, so the AK-model would arise for any N and K. However, if N could be
varied continuously, it would be possible to change the scale of the production process
3Returns to scale at x0 are said to be increasing when f
0(x0) > f(x0)=x0, decreasing when f 0(x0) <
f(x0)=x0, and constant when f
0(x0) = f(x0)=x0, for any function f(x).
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without aecting its eciency, for example by running half a process at the eciency
maximizing scale, thus violating our fundamental hypothesis, and making returns to
scale constant by assumption.
When the number of production processes must be a positive integer,
Y = max

0; a log (bK) ; 2a log

b
K
2

; 3a log

b
K
3

; : : :

 F (K) (6)
is the most output that can be produced with a given amount of input K. We imagine
that the number of production processes must be varied in discrete units, while the
input can be varied continuously. As an example, one can think of the number of
workers and the hours that each works. It is not possible to hire half a worker, but
it is possible to hire one to work part-time. The distinction is relevant when, as we
assume, a worker's productivity depends on the number of hours worked. As one can
easily imagine, the joint output of two part-timers working four hours each can dier
from that of someone working the full eight hours. Just as one can hire someone to
work eight hours a day, one can do so for eight hours and ve minutes. Hence, while
the adjustment on the extensive margin is restricted to integers, that on the intensive
margin is not.
Figure 1, which plots F (K), AK and H(K;N) for N = 1; 2; 3; 4 and a = b =
1, illustrates how F (K) converges toward AK as K increases. Mathematically, the
convergence can be shown as follows. For any K such that N(K) = be 1K is a
positive integer, F (K) = AK. For any K such that N(K) is not a positive integer,
let
I (K)  be 1K    (K) (7)
where I(K) 2 N is the natural number closest to be 1K such that I(K) < be 1K,
implying that (K) 2 (0; 1) and
F (K) = max

I (K) a log

b
K
I (K)

; (I (K) + 1) a log

b
K
I (K) + 1

: (8)
From the denition of I(K) above (7), it follows that K = (I(K) + (K))b 1e, so
F (K) = max

I (K) a log

e+
 (K)
I (K)
e

; (I (K) + 1) a log

e+
 (K)  1
I (K) + 1
e

(9)
while
AK = N (K) a log

b
K
N (K)

= (I (K) +  (K)) a: (10)
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Figure 1: Convergence of F (K) toward AK with ecient scaling.
According to Taylor's theorem (see for example Sydster et al. (1991)), for any function
f that is twice continuously dierentiable, there exists  2 (0; 1) such that
f (x) = f (x0) + f
0 (x0) (x  x0) + 1
2
f 00 (x0 +  (x  x0)) (x  x0)2 (11)
where the last element is Lagrange's error term for a rst-order approximation of
f(x) around x0. For any integer I, the function I log(K=I) is twice continuously
dierentiable with respect to K, so log(e + (K)=I(K)e) is too, and (setting x =
e+ (K)=I(K)e and x0 = e) we have
log

e+
 (K)
I (K)
e

= 1 +
 (K)
I (K)
 
((K))2
2(I(K))2
1 + (K)I(K)
2 (12)
for some  2 (0; 1). Multiplying by I(K)a yields
I (K) a log

e+
 (K)
I (K)
e

= I (K) a+  (K) a 
a ((K))
2
2I(K)
1 + (K)I(K)
2 (13)
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so that
I (K) a log

e+
 (K)
I (K)
e

= AK  
a ((K))
2
2I(K)
1 + (K)I(K)
2 (14)
exploiting the decomposition above (10). Similarly, Taylor's theorem implies that
(I (K) + 1) a log

e+
 (K)  1
I (K) + 1
e

= AK  
a ((K) 1)
2
2(I(K)+1)
1 + '(K) 1I(K)+1
2 (15)
where ' 2 (0; 1). As K grows, N(K) = be 1K increases, making I(K) rise, and it
follows from the expressions above (9, 14 and 15) that F (K) converges toward AK.
Hence, as replication increases with input use, returns to scale become constant, even
if the number of production processes cannot be varied continuously.4
Producers seek to maximize prots, and producing eciently, getting the most
output possible from any amount of input, as determined above, is necessary for this.
In addition, producers, who are assumed to be price-takers in the input market, must
decide how much input to rent from consumers. Letting output be numeraire, having
a price of one, and assuming perfect competition also in the output market, they do so
by maximizing prots
 (K) = F (K)  (r + )K (16)
for a given rental rate r and depreciation rate  2 (0; 1), imagining input K is physical
capital.5 We must have
r = A   (17)
4If instead of being a constant, b were a non-rival input among production processes, so that B = b,
the problem of choosing the optimal number of replications would remain unchanged and yield the
production function Y = ae 1BK, which has increasing returns to scale in inputs B and K jointly.
Romer (1990 and 1994) and Jones (1999) argue that replication leads to increasing returns to scale,
since technology, or ideas, are non-rival across production processes. Of course, not all innovations
are non-rival, and even those that are non-rival are not always non-excludable. Schumpeter (1934),
Griliches and Schmookler (1963), Schmookler (1966), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), Grossman and
Helpman (1991a, b), Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992), and Romer (1993)
all stress the importance of prots, and thus excludability, in driving innovation. Because externalities
in production are non-rival inputs, they too can aect the returns to scale, as is illustrated by Romer
(1986) and Lucas (1988).
5The input does not have to be physical capital, but in order to complete the model, we need to take
a stand on what it is and how it is accumulated. The input could even be a composite. For example,
with the production process y = log(ql), we have Y = N log((Q=N)(L=N))  H(Q;L;N), which
yields N(Q;L) = e 1Q=(+)L=(+) and Y = H(Q;L;N(Q;L)) = (+ )e 1Q=(+)L=(+).
Setting a = + , b = 1 and k = q=(+)l=(+) makes this framework identical to that above, with
constant returns to scale in the composite input K = Q=(+)L=(+).
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in a competitive equilibrium with nonnegative production. If the interest rate were
higher than this, prots would be negative for all input levels, since the average product
is at most A, so there would be no demand for input and no production. If the interest
rate were lower than A , each producer would demand an innite amount of input, as
this would make its average product equal A, which would be greater than its average
cost r + , making prots innitely large. Inserting for the equilibrium interest rate
(17) into the prot function (16) yields
 (K) = F (K) AK  0 (18)
which is strictly negative whenever F deviates from AK. As a result, a competitive
equilibrium is only feasible when all production occurs at points on the production
function where returns to scale are exactly constant.6 Hence, when the economy-wide
output changes, the number of producers and production processes adjusts so that
all that remain active have an average productivity of A, since otherwise their prots
would be strictly negative.
With imperfect competition in nal goods, we have
r =
  1

F 0 (K)   (19)
where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between dierentiated nal goods (or the
inverse of the elasticity of demand). This is the standard rst-order condition for prot
maximization with imperfect competition, after normalizing the price to unity, see for
example Acemoglou (2008), and implies that producers apply a constant gross mark-up
of =(  1) > 1 to the marginal cost of production (r + )=F 0(K).7 Each of the
H(K; I) = Ia log

b
K
I

(20)
functions that make up F (K), were I 2 N+, is strictly concave inK for all I > 0. Hence,
unless prots are maximized at a point where the number of production processes
6This is in line with Romer (1990, 1994) and Jones' (2005) point that perfect competition is in-
compatible with increasing returns to scale. In our setup it is also incompatible with K being at a
point where F (K) has decreasing returns, because a producer could then raise both her sales and prot
margin with a large enough increase in input use. If the returns to scale of F (K) were decreasing for
all K, decreasing returns would be compatible with perfect competition.
7For example, with an inverse demand function p(Y ) for the output Y of a particular producer,
yielding her relative price p as a function of her sales Y = F (K), her prots are p(F (K))F (K)  
(r + )K. Assuming an interior solution, prot-maximization is given by the rst-order condition
(  1)= p(F (K))F 0(K) = r + , where  = p0(F (K))F (K)=p(F (K)).
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changes, and we transition betweenH(K; I) andH(K+I), or atK = 0, or for innitely
large K, the rst order condition (19) must hold. The latter two are not feasible in an
equilibrium with production, as they would imply a zero or innite demand for input.
To see that prots cannot be maximized at any point KI where F transitions between
H(K; I) and H(K + I), note that this would require
  1

H 01(KI ; I)  r +  
  1

H 01(KI ; I + 1) (21)
the rst inequality so that prots do not rise as K is reduced along H(K; I), the second
so that they do not rise as K is increased along H(K; I + 1). The transition point KI
is given by H(K; I) = H(K; I + 1), which yields
KI =
(I + 1)I+1
bII
(22)
for I = 1; 2; 3; : : : Exploiting that H 01(K; I) = IaK 1, we have
H 01(KI ; I) = ab
(I + 1)I
II
< ab
(I + 1)I+1
II 1
= H 01(KI ; I + 1) (23)
for nite I, contradicting the condition (21) necessary for prots to be maximized at
KI , H
0
1(KI ; I)  H 01(KI ; I + 1). The rst-order condition (19) is also necessary for an
equilibrium with production on the linear parts of F , which equal AK, since otherwise
the marginal revenue (   1)=A of using an additional unit of input would always be
greater, or smaller, than the marginal cost r+ , making input demand innitely large,
or zero, respectively. The condition with perfect competition (17) is a special case of
that with imperfect competition (19) for !1, so the more general expression is used
below. Inserted into the prot function (16) it yields equilibrium prots
 = F (K)    1

F 0 (K)K (24)
which can be non-negative at points where F has increasing, decreasing or constant
returns to scale.
The production function F assumes that the allocation among the underlying pro-
cesses is optimal. Therefore, these must either be operated by the same producer, or be
coordinated across producers in an eort to maximize eciency and reduce costs. This
can happen indirectly through outsourcing, or directly through arrangements such as
code sharing among airlines. Alternatively, the coordination can arise as a result of all
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producers choosing their production levels so as to satisfy the same prot-maximizing
rst-order condition (19), assuming they have the same degree of market power. Hence,
F can represent the production function of each individual producer, or that of the econ-
omy as a whole. In either case there is convergence toward constant returns to scale as
the number of replications increases. With perfect competition, individual production
satises constant returns to scale at all levels of replication, so the same applies to
aggregate production.
3 Equilibrium
Consumers, who are assumed to be price-takers, rent out their capital S for a rate of
return r. In addition, they collect prots  generated by production. These resources
are used to accumulate capital and purchase consumption goods C. Consumption and
saving decisions are made so as to maximize the discounted lifetime utilityZ 1
0
C (t)1    1
1   e
 tdt (25)
subject to the budget constraint
_S (t) = r (t)S (t) + (t)  C (t) (26)
with respect to the control C and the state S, given paths for the interest rate r and
prots , and values for the constant relative risk-aversion parameter  > 0, discount
rate  2 (0; 1) and initial capital stock S0 > 0. The rst-order condition is
_C
C
=
r   

(27)
the usual requirement for the optimal consumption path.8
The market-clearing condition for the input
K = S (28)
determines the equilibrium rental rate r. Due to Walras' law, this condition also
guarantees that the market for output clears. Combining the rst-order conditions
8There is also a standard no-Ponzi game constraint, limt!1 S(t) exp( 
R t
0
r(x)dx)  0, and transver-
sality condition, limt!1 S(t) exp( 
R t
0
r(x)dx) = 0, see Acemoglou (2008).
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from maximizing prots (19) and utility (27) yields
_C
C
=
 1
 F
0 (K)     

(29)
while the budget constraint (26) becomes
_K = F (K)  K   C (30)
after substituting in for prots (16) and the market-clearing condition (28).
The production function F (K) is not concave, so the rst-order condition for the
corresponding planner problem, _C=C = (F 0(K)  )=, does not necessarily charac-
terize the path that maximizes life-time utility (25) subject to the resource constraint
(30), even when competition is perfect ( ! 1). However, when households take the
real interest rate and prots as given, their budget constraints (26) are linear, making
the rst-order condition (27) necessary and sucient for optimality. The two solutions
can dier because the planner might be willing to sacrice current consumption to
move to a point where the input is used more eciently, thus allowing for higher future
consumption. For individual households the rate of return, and eciency with which
the input is used, is given, so they cannot consider such trade-os. By separating the
decision of how much input to accumulate from that of how much to use in production,
the non-concave problem is isolated to the simpler non-dynamic prot-maximization.
4 Dynamics
When competition is perfect, we have a standard AK-model for all levels of input, with
consumption, production and capital always growing at the constant rate  1(A  )
(see Rebelo (1991)). With imperfect competition, the dynamics are more complicated.
Whenever K  1=b, production F (K) is, and always will be, zero, so both consump-
tion and the stock of input approach zero. For K > 1=b, a steady-state equilibrium
with constant non-negative consumption and input use exists for any capital K and
consumption C satisfying
F 0
 
K

= I
 
K

a K 1 = ( + )

  1   (31)
and
C = F
 
K
   K = I   K a log b K
I
 
K
!   K (32)
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where I(K) 2 N denotes the optimal discrete number of processes associated with
input level K.
Figure 1 shows that before F (K) converges to AK, its slope varies with K. F goes
from one H-function to the next, so its slope F 0(K) is decreasing in K while moving
along any one H-function, but jumps up each time I(K) increases and F moves to a
new H-function. Inserting for the transition points KI and KI 1 from above (22) into
H 01(K; I) = IaK 1, we nd that while moving along H(K; I), the slope
F 0 (K) 2
 
ab

I
I + 1
I+1
; ab

I   1
I
I 1!
(33)
for I = 2; 3; 4; : : : Along H(K; 1), F 0(K) falls from ab to :25ab. As I increases, the
lower bound for F 0(K) rises, while the upper bound falls, both converging toward
A = abe 1  :368ab.9 Since the optimal number of processes I(K) is increasing in K,
it follows that an economy is more prone to getting stuck at a constant steady state
the smaller K is. That is, when  2 (:25ab; :368ab), it is possible for an economy that
starts out with little input to stall completely, while one that starts out with just a little
more input could grow endogenously forever, even if the two economies were identical
in all other respects. Moreover, the rate of return of the input would be lower in the
stalled economy, preventing it from attracting input from the other.
If  < :25ab (and K > 1=b), consumption growth is always strictly positive, and
therefore production and input use must also rise over time (though not necessarily in
every period). If  > ab; consumption is always shrinking, which can only be optimal
if the economy itself is shrinking. If  2 (:25ab; :368ab), consumption growth can be
positive or negative, but if the economy does not stagnate in a constant steady state and
accumulates enough input, the consumption growth rate converges toward a strictly
positive number. The closer  is to .368ab, the greater input stock an economy can
have and still risk stalling. If  2 [:368ab; ab), consumption growth can take any sign,
but there is a limit to how much the economy can grow, since consumption growth
would become negative, or zero, if it ever accumulated enough input for F to converge
to AK. Whenever K is large enough for F to be indistinguishable from AK, we have
a standard AK-model where consumption, input use and production are all growing
at the constant rate  1(A(  1)=     ) (see Acemoglou (2008)).
The less competitive an economy is, the smaller is , and the higher is the threshold 
that the marginal product F 0(K) has to exceed in order to avoid stagnating in a steady-
9Convergence of F 0(K) toward A follows from F (K) converging toward AK, but also from the fact
that limx!1(1 +m=x)x = em for any constant m.
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state without growth. Hence, according to our model, less competitive economies are
more prone to stalling.10 Of course, the degree of competition could easily change
over time, thereby aecting the growth dynamics. For example, an economy stuck
at a steady-state could start growing again endogenously if the degree of competition
increased suciently. Moreover, it could keep growing endogenously forever, even if
the increase in competition was just temporary.
5 Suboptimal replication
If the number of production processes could be varied continuously, returns to scale
would be constant no matter the scale the process is replicated at. However, when the
number of processes must be a positive integer, so that returns to scale are not constant
by assumption, replication only leads to constant returns to scale with the eciency-
maximizing scaling. There are many circumstances that can distort a producers choice
of how many processes to operate. Some examples are the time and costs incurred when
setting up or dismantling a process, xed costs associated with keeping it running,
regulatory requirements that vary with the size of the operation, and credit constraints
that inhibit producers from expanding at the eciency-maximizing rate. For simplicity,
we assume that the distortion is due to a government imposed tax or subsidy of  per
production process (transfered to the households). In addition, we imagine a perfectly
competitive economy, and let b = 1. As a result, a producer's prots are given by
Na log
K
N
  N   (r + )K  G (K;N) (34)
which is concave in N . Hence, the prot-maximizing number of processes is determined
by the rst-order condition
@G (K;N)
@N
= a

log
K
N
  1

   = 0 (35)
assuming the maximum is non-negative ( <  a(1 + log((r + )=a)). This yields the
prot-maximizing number of processes
N^ (K) = e 1 

aK (36)
10The same applies for high depreciation and discount rates.
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and the production function
Y = H

K; N^ (K)

= (a+ ) e 1 

aK  A^K (37)
which is linear, and thus has constant returns to scale. For  6= 0, we have A^ < A,
reecting that production is inecient whenever the scaling is distorted.
When the number of processes must be a positive integer,
max

0; a logK      (r + )K; 2a log K
2
  2   (r + )K; : : :

(38)
yields the most prots that can be generated with a given amount of input K. The
value of K at which one must switch from I to I+1 processes so as to maximize prots
is now given by the point where G(K; I) and G(K; I + 1) intersect, assuming prots
are non-negative at such a point ( < a(log(aI=(r+ ) log(1 + 1=I))  I log(1 + 1=I))).
This yields the transition points
K^I =
(I + 1)I+1
II
e

a (39)
for I = 1; 2; 3; : : :, which show that prot-maximizing producers use too few processes
when  > 0, and too many when  < 0, compared to what maximizes output (22).
Figure 2 illustrates what happens when producers use too few processes. For a =
b =  = 1, it plots A^K and H(K; I) for I = 1; 2; 3; : : : ; 16 (the latter are not labeled
in the gure), together with the total production, labeled F^ (K), that results with
the prot-maximizing transition points (39). These make production jump up as we go
from one H-function to the next, because the transitions are not where the H-functions
intersect (but instead where the G-functions intersect). One can easily show that
H

K^I+1; I + 1

 H

K^I ; I

=  (40)
implying that production jumps by  units whenever the number of processes increases
by one. Hence, when replication happens at a suboptimal scale, production with a
discrete number of processes does not converge toward a linear production function.
Instead, it converges toward a piecewise linear function that jumps up or down each time
the number of production processes changes. Because of these jumps, the production
function does not satisfy constant returns to scale, even for large K.
Inserting for the transition points K^I and K^I 1 into H 01(K; I) = IaK 1, we nd
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Figure 2: Lack of convergence toward AK with inecient scaling.
that while moving along H(K; I),
F^ 0 (K) 2
 
a

I
I + 1
I+1
e 

a ; a

I   1
I
I 1
e 

a
!
(41)
for I = 2; 3; 4; : : :, which as I increases, converges towards ae 1 =a ( 6= A^). When
 > 0, so that an ineciently low number of processes is used, all operated at an
ineciently high scale, F^ 0(K) is lower than it would be if eciency were maximized,
for all I, thus making the economy more prone to stalling in a steady-state without
growth, or even shrinking over time. If  < 0, the number of processes is ineciently
high, the scale ineciently low, and F^ 0(K) is higher than it would be if eciency were
maximized, but the economy shrinks whenever the number of processes increases.
6 Conclusions
We show how the AK-model of economic growth can arise endogenously through the
eciency-maximizing replication of an underlying production process with returns to
scale that vary with the intensity it is operated at. The result applies for a discrete
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number of replications, thus overcoming the so-called integer problem. When compe-
tition is perfect, the AK-model arises for all levels of input use and production. With
imperfect competition, it only arises for a large enough number of replications, so it is
possible for an economy to stagnate in a steady state without growth, while another
that starts out with just a little more input, but is otherwise identical, could go on
growing endogenously forever. Moreover, the marginal product of the input would be
lower in the stalled economy, making it unable to attract a ow of input from the
other. An economy is less prone to stalling the larger it is, and the higher the degree
of competition among its producers. Our model suggests that even a temporary inow
of input, or transitory increase in competition, could start an everlasting growth spurt.
Even if replication leads to constant returns to scale in production, never-ending
endogenous growth might not materialize. The reason is that the economy might not
accumulate all inputs, making returns to scale decreasing in those it does accumulate
endogenously. For example, in the Solow (1956) model, returns to scale are constant
in capital and labor jointly, and therefore decreasing in capital alone, the only input
it assumes that the economy amasses endogenously. Of course, as Lucas (1988) shows,
what matters is not just what the economy accumulates in quantity, but also in quality.
If it does not endogenously amass more workers, but does accrue human capital in terms
of improved skills, it can still grow endogenously, even in per-capita terms. The same
is true if land, usually considered to be available in given amounts for the economy
as a whole, is used more intensively or eciently. Because it is dicult to imagine an
input that cannot be accumulated in quantity or quality, or used more eciently, non-
decreasing returns to scale all but guarantee sustained endogenous economic growth.
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